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Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. Pp. 400.  
Since the publication of the first volume in 2004, the Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics series has established itself as an indispensable resource for 
those working in metaphysics. Although officially a book series, OSM is in 
effect a specialized journal. Most contributions appear to be invited, with a 
small number selected from submissions to an annual prize competition open 
to scholars within ten years of their PhD.  
The second volume reviewed here consists of three contributions each 
to the topics of property dualism, the philosophy of time, and theism. In 
addition, four miscellaneous papers are assembled under the heading “Issues 
in Ontology”. There is not enough review space to discuss all 13 papers.  
With the exception of those on property dualism, the papers do not 
explicitly engage each other. The volume provides an index of names, but not 
of subjects.  
The symposium on property dualism consists of Ned Block’s “Max 
Black’s Objection to Mind-Body Identity” (ch. 1) and commentaries by John 
Perry (ch. 2) and Stephen L. White (ch. 3). Block’s paper, which is 76 pages 
long, defends the identity theory against a close relative of the Knowledge 
Argument.  
In “Goodbye Growing Block” (ch. 4), the first of three chapters under 
the heading “The Open Future”, Trenton Merricks targets the view that the 
present is the edge of the growing block of reality, which includes the past but 
not (yet) the future. A growing block theorist needs to explain how that 
“objective” notion of the present relates to the ordinary “subjective” one, as 
deployed in what we might call “present-involving thoughts” - your thought “I 
am reading at the present time”, and Caesar's thought “I am crossing the 
Rubicon at the present time”. Merricks argues that the growing blocker faces 
a dilemma, with embracing an error theory for such thoughts on one horn and 
undermining the motivation for her view on the other. If the subjective present 
is the same as the objective one, then almost all existing present-involving 
thoughts are false – they do not occur at the edge of the block. Merricks 
argues that you have no reason to think that your thought is one of the 
exceptional few. Epistemically, present-involving thoughts on the growing 
edge of reality are on a par with those inside the block. On the other horn of 
the dilemma, the growing block theorist takes the subjective and objective 
present to be distinct; she gives an indexical account of the former, perhaps. 
But then, Merricks argues, the growing block view cannot account for our pre-
theoretical thinking about time, and it is unclear what would motivate it. 
Some growing block theorists may want to challenge the epistemic 
parity assumption. Peter Forrest has already suggested a more radical 
response: while past people such as Caesar exist, they are dead and do not 
have thoughts, let alone present-involving ones.1 Forrest also contributes to 
the volume under review, and indeed uses his version of the growing block 
theory to give an account of physical necessity. His “General Facts, Physical 
Necessity, and the Metaphysics of Time” (ch. 6) develops what he calls the 
“mortmain” theory: “the dead hand of the past is constraining the future” (p. 
142). The fundamental notion of necessity is time-relative: a proposition is 
necessary at time t if there exists a truth-maker for it at t. Given the growing 
block theory, truth-makers accumulate over time, and hence what is 
necessary at some time remains necessary forever after. Forrest then defines 
other grades of necessity. A proposition is physically necessary if it has been 
necessary since the beginning of the universe, and it is absolutely physically 
necessary if it has always been necessary. The truth-makers for such 
necessities are Russellian general facts, which correspond to universal 
quantifications.  
Eli Hirsch’s “Rashi’s View of the Open Future: Indeterminateness and 
Bivalence” (ch. 5) and John Hawthorne's “Epistemicism and Semantic 
Plasticity” (ch. 10) both explore accounts of indeterminacy that respect 
bivalence. Hirsch attributes to Rashi, a  mediaeval Talmudist, the view that the 
openness of the future gives rise to cases of genuinely, objectively  
indeterminate truths. Suppose that it is indeterminate at time t whether p is 
true at a later time t' (whether a sea-battle will take place at t', say). By 
suitable disquotation principles, it follows that it is indeterminate at t whether it 
is true at t whether p is true at t'. This sets the account in contrast to a 
traditional Aristotelian one, according to which it is determinate at t (and later) 
that p is not true at t. Moreover, Hirsch's Rashi takes indeterminacy to be 
                                                 
1Peter Forrest, “The read but dead past. Reply to Braddon-Mitchell”, Analysis 64.4 (2004):  
358-62. The article replied is to is David Braddon-Mitchell, “How do we know it is now now?”, 
Analysis 64.3 (2004): 199-203. 
permanent: thus it is indeterminate at every later time whether it is true at t 
whether p is true at t'. Apart from the apparent openness of the future, the 
phenomenon of vagueness and certain interpretations of quantum mechanics 
provide further applications for a theory of indeterminacy. Hirsch usefully 
compares the menu of theoretical options in these areas. The Aristotelian 
position corresponds to a standard version of supervaluationism about 
vagueness, while the view attributed to Rashi corresponds to what Hirsch 
calls a “modified supervaluationism”. Like Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism 
about vagueness, modified supervaluations is committed to bivalence. But, 
Hirsch argues, it is still substantially different, since it posits genuine 
indeterminacy rather than mere ignorance. The best place to look for an 
explanatory payoff of genuine indeterminacy is the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics, according to Hirsch. The difference between a view which posits 
unknown “hidden variables” and a view on which there is genuine 
indeterminacy is not merely verbal.  
Hawthorne’s contribution, announced as a “progress report on 
unfinished business”, focuses on Williamson’s explanation of why we are 
often irremediably ignorant about facts involving baldness. Williamson grants 
that semantic facts supervene on non-semantic ones, including facts about 
use, and hence that there is a function from the latter to the former. But the 
semantic value of a vague term may differ from its actual one in a possible 
world that displays only minute differences from the actual one in the facts 
about use – it is “semantically plastic”. Williamson appeals to semantic 
plasticity in his explanation of our ignorance. Hawthorne raises a puzzle for 
this account, starting from the observation that semantic ascent preserves 
ignorance. We would expect to give a uniform explanation of our ignorance 
concerning `Fred is bald’ and `”Fred is bald” is true’. But if both are explained 
by appeal to semantic plasticity, then we would expect that there is a possible 
world w which displays only minute differences from the actual one in use, but 
in which speakers utter a falsehood when they say `“Fred is bald” is true iff 
Fred is bald’ (since the intension of our word `true’ maps w to a class that 
includes `Fred is bald’, but the intension of `true’ in the language of the 
inhabitants of w does not). Hawthorne argues that the latter is unacceptable, 
and explores two interesting solutions. The first constrains the plasticity of 
semantic terms in a way that avoids the unwelcome consequence. The 
second denies that semantic terms are plastic altogether. In David Lewis’s 
metasemantic theories, lack of semantic plasticity of certain terms is explained 
by the “reference magnetism” of perfectly natural properties. Hawthorne 
suggests that semantic properties and relations like truth and reference may 
also act as reference magnets.  
We may wonder whether this solution really explains our distinctive 
ignorance, though. For Lewis, natural properties help explain why the claim 
that our theories are true is non-trivial. But he does not suggest that these 
theories could not be known to be true. The hypothesis that truth is a 
reference magnet does not explain why we should not expect a future theory 
of truth to entail, in conjunction with facts about Fred and facts about use, that 
Fred is bald. Moreover, we may be worried that the postulation of such 
reference magnets is ad hoc in a way that Lewis’s was not. First, it is pre-
theoretically clear that some properties are more natural than others. But 
given the phenomenon of vagueness, it is not pre-theoretically clear that any 
of the properties that are candidate referents of `true’ is more natural than the 
others. Thus it is not clear whether it is indeed naturalness, in any intuitive 
sense, that accounts for the reference-magnetism of truth. Second, Lewis 
identified a variety of theoretical roles to be played by perfect naturalness. The 
question whether truth and other semantic properties are perfectly natural 
then raises a dilemma. If they are not, but still much more natural than 
suggested by the length of their definition in terms of perfectly natural 
properties (which seems to determine the degree of naturalness for Lewis), 
we have in effect two concepts of naturalness. This makes the theory less 
attractive. If, on the other hand, the perfectly natural properties include 
semantic ones such as truth, then they can no longer do all their work. Lewis 
wants to analyse duplication in terms perfectly natural properties. Together 
with the assumption that truth is a perfectly natural property, that analysis 
entails that no utterance tokens could be duplicates while differing in truth-
value, which appears to be the wrong result. Despite these misgivings, 
Hawthorne’s suggestion to allow non-fundamental properties to be reference-
magnets certainly deserves further discussion.  
Phillip Bricker’s “The Relation between General and Particular: 
Entailment vs Supervenience” (ch. 9) is concerned with the relationship 
between what exists and what is the case. Along the way he offers an 
insightful discussion of the ontological significance of supervenience claims. 
Some philosophers have explicated the idea that what exists needs to 
ontologically determine what is the case by the Truthmaker Principle: every 
truth has truthmakers. Truthmakers for a truth are here understood as entities 
whose joint existence entails the truth. Since general facts are not entailed by 
particular facts, the Truthmaker Principle entails that there exists something 
beyond particular facts. Bricker argues against the Truthmaker Principle, and 
proposes a different explication of the claim that what exists ontologically 
determines what is the case: the Subject Matter Principle, which says that 
every proposition has a subject matter. In his technical sense, a class of 
actual or possible entities E is a “subject matter” for a proposition Z if any 
proposition that entails for each members of E whether that member exists  
either entails Z or its negation. In other words, E is a subject matter for Z if Z 
supervenes on the existence facts involving members of E. Since the 
particular facts are a subject matter for the general facts, the Subject Matter 
Principle does not entail that there exists anything beyond particular facts.    
In Bricker’s fundamental ontology, there are only things. This ontology 
may satisfy the Subject Matter Principle if it is essential to each thing which 
particular facts hold of it. For on that assumption, the things form a subject 
matter for the particular facts, and because of the supervenience of the 
general facts on the particular ones, they also form a subject matter for the 
general facts. Bricker argues that his ontology, supererogatorily as it were, 
even satisfies the Truthmaker Principle. If both its intrinsic and extrinsic nature 
are essential to the world (which is a thing), then the world is a truthmaker for 
general facts. To satisfy either principle, a fundamental ontology of things only 
requires strong essentialist claims. According to Bricker, these claims are true, 
in some contexts, given some ways of identifying the things; and given the 
inconstancy of de re modal predications, they are false in other contexts, 
where we identify the things differently. This move may make some of us 
uncomfortable, since it might appear to make fundamental ontology 
dependent on our identification practices.   
In “Inexpressible Properties and Propositions” (ch. 7; included as the 
winner of the first OSM Younger Scholar Prize; subsequently awarded the 
APA Article Prize), Thomas Hofweber offers a sophisticated articulation of the 
view that properties and propositions are merely shadows of predicates and 
sentences. According to his “internalism”, apparent quantification over 
properties and propositions is a device to increase the expressive power of a 
language in a way that could also by achieved by infinitary logical 
constructions. Roughly, ‘There is a property that interests Fred’ corresponds 
to an infinite disjunction, with disjuncts such as `Tasting better than Diet Pepsi 
interests Fred’. However, this paraphrase will not be adequate if some 
properties are not expressible. Hofweber’s idea is to consider context-
sensitive terms, and what could be expressed by them in arbitrary contexts. 
The property of tasting better than Diet Pepsi is expressed by `tasting better 
than this’ in a context in which Diet Pepsi is supplied as the referent of `this’. 
On Hofweber’s modified proposal, ‘There is a property of beer that interests 
Fred’ is paraphrased by an infinite string of existential quantifiers `there exists 
vi‘ followed by an infinite disjunction with disjuncts such as `Tasting better than 
vi interests Fred’. The existential quantifiers range over all things; everything is 
available for demonstrative reference in a suitable context.  
In this story, there is nothing special about English. The above property 
is also expressed in Ancient Greek by the equivalent of `tasting better than 
this’, regardless of whether Ancient Greek is actually ever spoken in a context 
that allows demonstrative reference to Diet Pepsi. Hofweber suggests that the 
tenability of internalism crucially depends on whether the following 
“Expressibility Hypothesis” is true: “Different languages can differ in what can 
be expressed in them with context-insensitive expressions, and what 
speakers of these languages can in fact express in them. However, all 
languages agree on what speakers can express with them in arbitrary 
contexts” (p. 198-9).  
Michael Loux’ “Aristotle’s Constituent Ontology” (ch. 207) compares 
and contrasts Aristotle’s account of why particulars have the character they do 
with various contemporary ones. He suggests that the substantial forms, 
associated with a pattern of functional organization of an organism, can be 
characterized as structural universals, provided we do not assume that 
structural universals are to be explained in terms of the distribution of non-
structural ones.  
In the section “Metaphysics and Theism”, Hud Hudson’s “Beautiful 
Evils” (ch. 13) suggests a new solution to the problem of evil. What appears 
evil to us is beautiful for a being who can perceive a hyperspace in which our 
space is embedded. Its beauty is a good that compensates for the evil in the 
world. The two other papers discuss the relationship between theism and 
theories of universals. Roughly, one argues that theists do not need, and the 
other that they cannot have universals.  
Brian Leftow’s “God and the Problem of Universals” (ch. 11) argues that 
God’s concepts, construed as particulars, can do the theoretical work that 
universals offer to do. However, this reviewer was puzzled by the account it 
gives of truths such as “orange is more like red than blue is”, which are widely 
seen to pose a problem for nominalists. Leftow suggests the paraphrase 
“depending on God’s concept orange is more like depending on God’s 
concept [red] than depending on God’s concept blue is” (p. 338). The 
`depending’-locution appears to refer to relational properties. Leftow claims 
that his solution is isomorphic to the one given by Platonists, and that the 
latter is generally thought to be adequate. But it would seem that the Platonist 
can take the statement at face value, with the color terms referring to forms. 
The forms of the colors, unlike the concepts of the colors or the things that 
have the colors, are guaranteed to resemble each other in the right way.  
Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey Brower’s “A Theistic Argument against 
Platonism (and in support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity)” (ch. 12) 
argue against the conjunction of traditional theism and Platonism. They derive 
a contradiction from commitments they attribute to traditional theism and 
Platonism: that it follows that God’s creating an exemplifiable both is, and is 
not, logically prior to the exemplifiable being able to create an exemplifiable. 
The version of Platonism they discuss explains truths of the form `a is F’ in 
terms of a subject and an exemplifiable being F. They acknowledge that 
Russell’s paradox already restricts the scope of that approach. `John does not 
exemplify himself’ does not admit of such an explanation. However, they claim 
that an explanation of all predications except those that lead to Russell’s 
paradox might still be interestingly general and unified. If they are right about 
this, however, then perhaps a further restriction, for example to predications 
where `F’ does not mention exemplifiables, might still be worthy of 
consideration.     
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